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A Novel Framework for Planning Policy and Responsible Stakeholders in Industrial Wastewater Reuse Projects: A Case Study in Iran

Short title: Planning Policy Framework in industrial wastewater reuse projects

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Abstract

Industrial wastewater recycling projects are mainly used for alleviation of both water scarcity and contamination of freshwater bodies. These projects mainly address major challenges related to technological, and economic aspects rather than stakeholders responsibility. Hence, little is known for the role of responsible stakeholders as a major part of planning policy, which requires recognition of their crucial role and integration into associated procedures. This paper presents a new decision support framework to identify responsible stakeholders and reveal the role of their motivations. The approach integrates qualitative and frequency analysis methods into a comprehensive framework to identify the problems over the project lifetime from visible to their roots and link them together with stakeholders through deep mapping. The planning policy framework is applied to a real-world case study of industrial parks in Iran. The results of the case study show that visible economic, social, and technological problems are caused by responsible stakeholders with no direct role in those projects. Additionally, deep mapping analysis shows various deep roots caused by the government and industry are linked to visible problems across all project phases that are related to the role of stakeholders, their behaviour, and deep beliefs.

Keywords: Causal layered analysis; Industrial wastewater treatment; Planning policy framework; Responsible stakeholders;

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28 1 Introduction

Today, water resources in many parts of the world are under increasing pressure from irrigation-based food supply, increasing urban water demands and industrial growth especially in semi-arid and arid areas where water plays a vital role for their development, national economic growth, and environment (Cossio *et al.*, 2020). Among all water users, providing industrial water is crucial as lack of access to water resources may stop valuable economical productions. Furthermore, industrial wastewater is another major concern due to the contamination of untreated wastewater discharged into receiving water bodies (Piadeh *et al.*, 2014). Therefore, recycling industrial wastewater is a practical sustainable solution that can both provide accessible water and prevent contaminating freshwater bodies (Piadeh *et al.*, 2018a).

Nowadays, combining advanced treatment units (ATUs) with conventional treatment processes can result in less contamination in treated effluent (Naghedi *et al.*, 2020). Despite benefits of integrating these advanced technologies, stakeholders are sometimes reluctant to develop these units based on their own preferences and due to the complexity and uncertainty of reliability assessment in these ATUs and hence, overlook this scheme within the planning phases. As planning any wastewater reuse scheme needs active engagement of relevant stakeholders, the lack of appropriate involvement or having negative views on decision making, design, construction and operation phases may lead to a failure of these schemes over a long-term period (Salgot and Folch, 2018).

Several studies investigated the stakeholders' behaviour and their motives for being against the ATU development. For example, Ba-Alawi *et al.* (2020) analysed man-made incidents and faults in the ATU equipment. Piadeh *et al.*, (2018b) also analysed consultants' faults for design and contractors' failure in construction. For studies analysing environmental and economic risks, stakeholders were considered only as investees or investors (Hernández-Chover *et al.*, 2018). Some studies limited the role of stakeholders in end-users views to support recycled wastewater or willingness to pay tariffs (Dalhat Mu'azu *et al.*, 2020). Additionally, some studies only analysed the role of policymakers in strategic decisions such as increasing tariffs or environmental regulations to motivate ATU developments (Buzuku *et al.*, 2015). Some studies also analysed the role of stakeholders as public acceptance, number of stakeholders participating in the

development, number of new jobs created and health risk in sustainability assessment criteria (Cossio *et al.*, 2020). In relevant studies including abovementioned ones, the role of vital stakeholders was almost neglected and consequently, the main intention of interruption due to the stakeholders involvement were not studied properly. Hence, the main objective of this paper is to develop a new framework to analyse the role of relevant stakeholders and their motives for reusing treated industrial wastewater, which is raised from the following three research questions (RQs): (RQ1) which associated responsible stakeholders influence ATU projects and how they can be identified? (RQ2) what type of visible problems are caused by responsible stakeholders and how these problems can be distributed among the different processes of ATU projects? (RQ3) if there is any connection between deep beliefs of responsible stakeholders and associated problems?

To address these questions, the framework in this study aims to analyse stakeholders, futurology techniques and deep mapping as qualitative analysis to (1) identify relevant stakeholders and their role in different phases in an ATU project, (2) determine responsible stakeholders for relevant system failure and identify their motivations, and (3) map all levels of problems across the different phases of the project. Furthermore, frequency analysis is used to provide quantitative analysis. A comprehensive analysis developed in this study compares all identified problems, associated stakeholders. Additionally, the framework provides a vertical comparison between the connection of problems with responsible stakeholders and links all these analyses together through deep mapping. The next section describes the proposed methodology followed by its demonstration to the real-world case study. The results are then discussed, and key findings are finally summarised.

2 Methods

The proposed framework of this study as shown in Figure 1 contains three main steps to assess the role of responsible stakeholders in industrial wastewater reuse projects. Step 1 applies a method to identify the project phases over the project lifetime, key stakeholders, and their distribution over each phase of ATU projects. Step two entails identifying visible problems at various layers, connecting these problems to responsible stakeholders and investigation of their deep beliefs. Step 3 finally demonstrates a

comprehensive analysis including deep mapping for all layers and stakeholders over the lifetime of ATU projects. Note that the proposed methodology is generic that can be applied to similar ATU projects all over the world. Having said this, the proposed method is demonstrated in section 2.4 by its application to a real case study of industrial wastewater reuse projects in Iran.



Figure 1. Proposed framework in this study

2.1 Step 1: Stakeholder identification

The aim of this step is to specify the distribution of stakeholders across different project phases as the input of next steps and form a map to show how stakeholders with their roles are connected to core phases over the project lifetime. This needs different phases are clarified over the project lifetime (in section 2.1.1) and then the stakeholders are registered for each phase (in section 2.1.2).

2.1.1 Recognition of the project phases

Core phases defined in a project based on the primary goals can be recommended in four parts of "planning", "design", "construction", and "operation" (PMI, 2017). Core phases are first compiled from official documents such as project charts, procurement documents, organisational process assets, regulation and laws or internal instructions (Lalmi *et al.*, 2021).

This step entails identifying people, groups, experts and organisations that could impact or be affected by a decision, activity, or outcome of the project (Alcon *et al.*, 2014). Stakeholders here are classified as primary and secondary categories based on the stakeholder theory widely used in the literature (Gherghel *et al.*, 2020). The primary stakeholders are identified as those in the institutional positions with relevant roles dedicated across core phases based on official documents or administrative procedures. The secondary stakeholders with their roles can also be identified by the judgment of experts, i.e. primary stakeholders (Bendtsen *et al.*, 2021).

2.2 Step 2: Causal layered analysis

This step aims to list all the problems considered as obstruction of ATU developments through identifying a range of visible problems to their deep roots i.e. the causal layered analysis (CLA) method. Figure 2 shows the hierarchy of the CLA to clarify problems widely applied to a range of topics in the projects and find solutions influencing possible future scenarios positively (Miremadi, 2020). Three main layers of the CLA include (1) the visible problem layer (also called litany layer) representing the conventional perception of problems that seems obvious and visible; (2) the responsible stakeholders layer (e.g., systemic layer) representing social explanations of events, issues and problems documented in the visible problem layer. This layer also explores the roles of stakeholders responsible for occurrence of problems; (3) the deep belief layer (the worldview and metaphor layers) seeking values, assumptions, discourses, ideas, and more importantly deep beliefs of responsible stakeholders that cause visible problems but not necessarily consciously happen.



Figure 2. Structure of causal layered analysis defined to classify problems, stakeholders and their deep beliefs

117 2.2.1 Identification of visible problems

The visible problem layer is based on the problems identified through questionnaires/interviews by selected responders and strengthened by evidences from the project documents or site visits. All identified stakeholders in step 1 should introduce a representative person called a responder to participate an interview. The major problems can be classified under more sub-classes for better analysis. This classification is based on how decision-makers and experts are familiar to. However, the PEST framework is recommended here due to its ability to the holistic illustration of the current situations (Thakur, 2021). In this framework, all problems are divided into the 4 categories: (1) political problems at national, international and regional scales or regulations, which impact on developing ATUs negatively, (2) economic problems e.g. lack of financial mobilising, lack of allocated budget, budget cuts or requiring extra costs, (3) social problems e.g. lack of proper management, individual wrong behaviour or managers' personal preferences, (4) technical problems, particularly technological gap, maintenance issues and accessibility to desired equipment (Naghedi *et al.*, 2020).

The responders first need to raise the most challenging problem representing the main influential factor of improper ATU's development. Each responder is then asked to scrutinise the challenges in detail via (1) describing the problem, (2) classifying the type of the problem based on PEST classification, (3) specifying the occurrence of the problem among all of the core phases of the project (step 1.1), and (4) classifying all identified stakeholders under primary and secondary stakeholders (step 1.2). All identified problems are then clustered based on their similarities and the visible problem layer is finally formed.

2.2.2 Identification of responsible stakeholders

This layer identifies responsible stakeholders and their role in the project components over the project lifetime. For this purpose, each identified visible problem is assigned to a focus group with members from all relevant stakeholders. These focus groups describe relevant visible problems and their associated responsible stakeholders in which all responders are agreed through a qualitative Delphi technique (Cheng *et al.*, 2019). The output of this step is "specified responsible stakeholders" agreed by all responders.

Deep belief in here refers to the strong belief of stakeholders as the best way to manage or run the project. This can also reflect the understanding, knowledge, and experience of stakeholders for dealing with the project within all phases of the project including planning, design, construction and operation. Extracting deep beliefs is a challenging process mainly because it is subjective and discussed in the social sciences (Farrow, 2019). Here, responsible stakeholders are interviewed individually to find out their views and deep beliefs which consciously or unconsciously prevent developing the ATUs projects. Furthermore, it is recommended that specialists in various fields such as psychology, sociology, economy, management, philosophy, theology, political science, and history assist the interview to understand the deep beliefs of responsible stakeholders.

2.3 Step 3: Comprehensive Analysis

Step 3 is the comprehensive analysis through the LCA based on both quantitative and qualitative analyses by using horizontal & vertical analysis, and deep mapping. The horizontal analysis can provide details of each layer throughout the project lifetime (core phases) to realise the distribution of the problems, associated responsible stakeholders and their beliefs (Figure 3a). Hence, the horizontal analysis aims to (1) provide frequency analysis of visible problems, associated responsible stakeholders, and their deep beliefs, and (2) demonstrate the distribution of findings throughout the core phases. Regardless of the ATU project lifetime, interactions between different layers are evaluated by vertical analysis (Figure 3b). These interactions link (1) the visible problems level to the responsible stakeholder layer, (2) the responsible stakeholder layer to the deep beliefs layer, and (3) the visible problems layer to the deep beliefs layer. Deep mapping shows how layers and divergent phases of the ATU projects are linked together and demonstrates how visible problems can be interconnected with responsible stakeholders and sequentially any hidden beliefs behind them.



Figure 3. Schematic representation of comprehensive analysis in (a) horizontal stage, (b) vertical stage

2.4 Case study

The above methodology is here demonstrated through its application to real-world case study of industrial wastewater reuse projects located in industrial parks in Iran. The parks are mainly based in semi-aired regions suffering from a lack of industrial water access (Naghedi *et al.*, 2020). Despite using only 6% of the total water demand, there are major challenges to supply this demand in these regions. Besides, untreated industrial wastewater can negatively affect both human health and the environment due to highly toxic contaminants (ISIPO, 2021). Therefore, industrial wastewater reuse has been highly recommended over the last decades as a practical sustainable solution to recover treated wastewater as a new water resource and minimise discharging contamination into freshwater bodies (ISIPO, 2021). While the initial plan was to treat wastewater by secondary processes and reuse it for landscape consumption (for 62 out of 187 industrial estates), the updated plan was to expand the treatment by using advanced treatment units for reusing treated wastewater for industrial purposes such as supplying cooling towers (Figure 4). Despite the above strategic plan in Iran, only 8 ATUs, accounted for only about 4% of the total treated wastewater, is currently operating with the updated plan as shown in Figure 4a (ISIPO, 2021). This can be mainly due to facing many problems posed all over the project lifetime. These problems are analysed in the following within three steps outlined in the above methodology.



The analysis started off with reviewing official documents such as procurement documents of ATU construction and operation, consultancy, and plant monthly reports of ATUs operation to identify the core phases of the ATU plants and associated stakeholders as illustrated in Figure 5 with more details in part A and Figure S1 in the online supplementary material. Further to contacting the stakeholders, 78 responders agreed to participate in the interview listed in Table S1 in the online supplementary material. Each responder first fills out a questionnaire and then participated in a meeting held for focus groups based on the details outlined in the methodology. The results of causal layered structure are reported in Table S2 in

the online supplementary material. The comprehensive analysis including horizontal, vertical, and deep
 mapping are discussed below.



Figure 5. Identified stakeholders and distribution of their role in the core phases of industrial wastewater reuse projects 3.1 Visible problems

Table 1 shows the result of the PESTEL method by using the input from the responders to identify the visible problems. Out of the six categories in the PESTEL method, the responses for number of general perceptions, total identified problems, and number of total visible problems are classified under four categories including political, economic, social and technical components. Although responders initially stated in the questionnaires that economic component is the major issue preventing the development of ATU systems for treating industrial wastewater, the major issue was then moved to the social component followed by technical component in practice, when responders analysed all problems in detail within the focus group meetings. This may show that responders tent to see all the problems in the shape of economic, especially because lack of budget resources are always proposed by the government. Furthermore, this comparison shows that the main nature of problems hindering the proper development of ATU systems can vary from economic to social aspects when they are analysed in detail compared to when they are only based on general perceptions. Therefore, it seems that scrutiny of the project problems can lead to clarify the real source of the problems at the litany layer.

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216	Table 1	1. Responses and classification	on of problems based on the PES'	TEL method
	PESTEL	number of general	number of mentioned	Total number of visible
	components	perceptions	problems	problems
1	Political	3	0	0
2	Economical	35	98	3
3	Social	23	338	11
4	Technical	17	310	10
5	Environmental	0	0	0
7	Legal	0	0	0
8	Total	78	746	24

Figure 6 shows the results of the horizontal analysis (i.e., through the core phases of the projects) for all visible problems. The results imply that the distribution of the visible problems is inconsistent at different phases. More specifically, majority of more visible problems are related to design, construction, and operation phases compared to planning and temporary delivery. Besides, while a large proportion of problems in design and operation phases are related to social problems, construction phase predominantly has technical issues. However, economic problems seem to exist as a minor issue in planning, construction, and operation phases.

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 $\begin{array}{r} 40\\ 41\\ 42\\ 2244\\ 45\\ 46\\ 2267\\ 46\\ 2267\\ 49\\ 2270\\ 51\\ 2282\\ 53\\ 54\\ 2295\\ 54\\ 2295\\ \end{array}$ On the other hand, although the same number of problems are reported for design, construction, and operation phases, it seems that the design phase is more vulnerable and plays a vital role in delaying the ATU projects especially because the six mentioned visible problems occur in only six months whereas the duration of construction and operation phases are a year and up to 25 years, respectively. Therefore, social problems in the design phase seem to be the most critical ones. More details of these problems reported by the focus groups include (1) qualified consultants are not used or there is lack of qualified one or those

hired are unable to design the plant properly, (2) lack of international consultants in the projects that are qualified for the design, (3) lack of access or use of recent practical national researches or neglecting them, and (4) lack of hiring accredited private laboratories to enhance the results and hence declining the errors, and instead using limited parameters with a large uncertainty for ATUs design. In other words, identified social problems in this part are mainly related to avoiding or neglecting qualified or accredited stakeholders that can provide more accurate design plans.

3.2 Responsible stakeholders

Figure 7 shows the results of the identified stakeholders and their distribution throughout the lifetime of the projects. As can be seen, the government is responsible for 40% of the total number of identified stakeholders causing the visible problems. Furthermore, Unlike the results of stakeholder registration obtained in step 1 (stakeholder identification), responders reported that the government, industries, and politicians are responsible for some problems in which the government has no official role (blue dots in Figure 7). This finding is a crucially important that reflects problems which cannot be addressed through common existing channels relying heavily on official roles or official procedures. In other words, while normal and contractual procedures such as claiming processes or official meetings can be sought when problems appear between different stakeholders, these tools cannot resolve the outstanding problems because responsible for visible problems but have no official roles. Thus, these viral points i.e., where stakeholders are responsible for visible problems but have no official role, should be carefully extracted to find future innovative solutions such as designing win-win scenarios for the cases where all responsible stakeholders obtain the partial desired benefits.

Besides, the results show that the stakeholders are responsible mostly in the construction and operation phases, which means problems in these phases are carried out by more diverse stakeholders. This is crucial as when more responsible stakeholders are engaged in one phase, finding a solution needs more agreements upon all stakeholders, which result in a more complicated situation with harder conflict resolution. Therefore, the construction phase involving six responsible stakeholders and contains 27% of total stakeholders, is recognised as a critical core phase of the ATU projects. However, this may not be compatible with general perception of stakeholders about the most critical core phase, in which design operation phase is introduced by initial perception (See Table S3 in the online supplementary material). This can show that how deep analysis of ATU's projects through scrutinising responsible stakeholders can reveal actual role of these stakeholders and clarify impact of their role in finding critical core phase of ATU projects.





3.3 Deep beliefs

Based on detailed interview with responsible stakeholders, ten main reasons were extracted as "deep beliefs" of responsible stakeholders that cause visible problems (Table 2). Figure 8 illustrates the distribution of these beliefs throughout the core phases. As can be seen, presence of "no long-term planning" belief, reflecting a lack of attention to/analysis of possible future scenarios, consequence of wrong decisions or selections, is spread all over the project core phases and accounted for 23% of total identified deep beliefs. Additionally, four other beliefs (i.e. "no systemic planning", "individualism criteria", "lack of trust", and "adherence to anti-value") are in place for 4 out of 5 phases. Therefore, a large share and distribution of these beliefs for developing the ATU projects can be translated into complex situations and hence

obstacle with numerous visible problems. Furthermore, the design phase stands alone for 35% of total identified deep beliefs closely followed by the construction and operation phases. Besides, almost all revealed beliefs occur in the design phase which are more severe than other phases.

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Code	Title	Definition
B1	No systemic approach	No clear understanding about nature of problems, relationships and interactions
		between the components and no analysis to obtain a reasonable solution.
B2	No long-term planning	Lack of attention to/ analysis of possible future scenarios, consequence of making wrong decisions or selections.
B3	No flexibility with	No capacity for critical thinking and accepting reasonable recommendations and
	criticism	no belief in meritocracy based on skills and abilities.
B4	Individualism criteria	Focus on individual achievements instead on quality-oriented or plan-oriented
		criteria to select staff with the highest ranked occupational efficiency
B5	Sense of being wiser	Superior feeling and top-down / hierarchy vision because of believing in having
	-	higher educational level or position in comparison to knowledge or experience
B6	Lack of trust	Existing long history of penalising and wrong activities that ruin trusts
B7	Westernisation	Believing in foreign activities, equipment, or any related issues without any
		reasonable evidence
B8	Pan-iranism	Superiority thinking towards Iranian (national) experts without any reasonable
		evidence
B9	Adherence to anti-value	A tendency to legal abuse and cheat as a value, having a system based on
-		relationships, prior personal interests over public ones because cheating is a
		cultural value and is equal to cleverness
B10	Deen gans	Deep gap in cultural social and characteristic between stakeholders



Figure 8. Distribution of deep beliefs within the core phases of the projects

3.4 Comparison of different layers

While the visible problems are usually easier to identify in comparison to deeper layer such as responsible stakeholders, correlation between these layers shows connections between frequency or type of visible problems and different stakeholders, as illustrated in Figure 9a. Out of all responsible stakeholders, only the government and industry are responsible for all three types of visible problems (i.e., economic, social, and technical) while politicians and contractors are reported mainly for social and technical problems. Other stakeholders are recognised as responsible for only one type of visible problems. This shows that while a few stakeholders may cause diverse forms of visible problems for the process of ATU development, some others can be easily identified for one specific type of the visible problems. For example, consultants, influencers, laboratories, and researchers are categorised as responsible stakeholders causing social problems only. While each type of visible problems needs a unique solution, economic problems can be resolved by the same method applied for many responsible for several problems compared to other stakeholders. This implies that until these problems are not addressed, ATU development is unlikely to be on the right track.





The key massage of comparison between visible problems and deep beliefs of stakeholders is to understand how to translate beliefs into visible problems. This is crucial as these beliefs are usually hidden behind the visible problems and original and true instincts are hard to be recognised. For example, while running ATU projects need at least 3 years (Figure 5), managers prefer to agree with developing projects with the shorter

required time to account these projects operational as an outcome of their management period. Consequently, insufficient budget is always reflected as the main issue unless associated deep beliefs are really understood well.

Figure 9b shows the distribution of identified deep beliefs in the forms of economic, social, and technical visible problems. As can be seen, 4 out of 10 identified deep beliefs are reported in all three forms of visible problems likely due to the complexity of their situation that may not be understandable within one single form. These beliefs include "lack of systematic and long-term planning", "lack of trust between different stakeholders" and "adherence to anti-value action". This deteriorates when the frequency of reported visible problems for these deep beliefs increase compared to others. Consequently, this situation clearly shows how deeper layers can change the understanding of visible problems with respect to complicated deep beliefs that may be difficult to resolve.

3.5 Deep mapping

Deep mapping aims to connect all vertical layers, i.e., visible problems, responsible stakeholders, and deep beliefs, to horizontal approaches, i.e., core phases of the ATU projects. Figure S2 in the online supplementary material illustrates full details of the complex network but part of it for the government is shown in Figure 10. These figures obviously implies that analysis of the ATU development can be an arduous task to understand when only visible problems are in place. Complex network between visible problems, responsible stakeholders, and their beliefs represents complicated transforms between visible problems such as economic or technical to deeper and other strategic concepts including lack of systemic approach and long-term planning. More specifically, the frequency of lines in the earlier phases, drawn in Figure 10, show the role of the government as main responsible stakeholders. However, their beliefs and consequent actions cannot be translated easily into uniform type such as just economic or social form and require further deep analysis. While some social visible problems can be connected to deep beliefs, finding relationship between deep beliefs and technical problems, for instance, seems to be impossible. Hence, this mapping can reveal the complexity level of problems in the ATU development and provide at least a



network that connects different layers to each other which can be used for further long-term planning and 327

management. 328



340 4. Conclusions

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This paper presented a new decision-making framework to identify visible problems, relevant responsible stakeholders, and the role of their beliefs in the core phases of industrial wastewater reuse projects (i.e., planning, design, construction and operation) by using both qualitative and quantitative analysis, including stakeholder analysis, CLA, deep mapping and frequency analysis. The methodology was demonstrated by its application to a real case study in industrial parks in Iran. Based on the results obtained, the following can be noted from this study:

- To prioritise the importance of distinct phases of ATU projects, frequency of visible problems per se cannot be considered but timeframe for occurrence of these problems is also important. For example, planning and design phases usually take less time compared to construction and operation phases and any delays in these phases caused by any visible problems can effect more than other phases.

- By connecting the role of responsible stakeholders to visible problems, it can be seen that some stakeholders are responsible for some problems that have no official role. This implies that those problems cannot be addressed through administrative procedures and consequently those with no official role may have to take their own method without accepting their roles.

- Identifying deep beliefs can reveal that most of the deep beliefs are hidden behind the visible problems and consequently original failure causes may never be recognised if these deep beliefs are unidentified properly. Hence, addressing the visible problems is insufficient to satisfy the needs for identifying deep beliefs and even if the problems can be resolved in short-time, but remain unresolved for longer periods.

- The deep mapping implies that the ATU development is a challenging task when only visible problems are considered and reveals the complexity level of problems in the ATU development. Deep roots are connecting complexly to visible problems across the projects core phases. Hence, these beliefs and consequently associated actions can be challenging to understand and resolve.

It seems this study gives opportunities to interested stakeholders to extract and remove the obstacles depending on how they want to face the issue. In other words, while detailed visible problems may be easily

handled in these projects, they may be presented again in short-term or in further projects because their roots are not actually realised. However, beliefs can alleviate the problems over a long-time period but require more budget, significant time and agreement between a wide range of stakeholders. Therefore, integrated and comprehensive assessments are suggested for each strategy in future research works. This assessment can aid to clarify the best option, requiring less financial budget, more willingness for stakeholders to accept and less time duration to plan and operate those strategies that are crucial to make informed decisions by stakeholders.

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1 Appendix. Supplementary data

Part A: In-detailed description of case study's identified stakeholders and core phases

The core phases of the ATU development are identified as (1) planning, (2) design, (3) construction, (4) temporary delivery, and (5) operation. Temporary delivering phase is added to recommended core phases because in this phase ATUs are operated by multi-stakeholders, which result in the occurrence of many problems. According to the documents review, core phases of the developing ATUs involve four primary stakeholders including (1) government, (2) consultancies, (3) contractors and (4) industries. The government (i.e., the Ministry of Industry and its subsidiaries in provinces) is mainly responsible for decision making about feasibility studies and developing ATUs in industrial parks. Consultancies provide documents such as the specification of potential ATUs' processes, environmental impact assessment and as-built sheets. Contractors build the treatment plants based on the design conducted by the consultancies and operate the infrastructure in the temporary delivering phase. They finally, deliver the ATUs to industries for permanent operation. While primary stakeholders are found by these documents, secondary stakeholders are added through interview with the representatives of primary stakeholders. Five secondary stakeholders are recognised including. (1) accredit laboratories which are in charge of measuring samples of wastewater quality to provide required design's inputs, (2) researchers i.e. university or research institution to introduce new processes of industrial wastewater reuse, (3) technology providers who are responsible for manufacturing required equipment, (4) suppliers who are responsible for international trading of equipment that is not produced in the country and (5) influencers such as NGOs, religious leaders or community leaders who are responsible for positivity shifting stakeholders' paradigms about reusing treated wastewater.

			-			
Project	t Average lifespan	Processes description		Government	(1) (A) Planning p	hase Industries
(A)	1 year	- Planning for developing and running the project				
	•	- Specifying potential locations		I Ministry of industry		
		- Allocating pre-feasibility study's financial budget			(B) Design pl	()/ Board o
	0.5	 Determining rough required budget 		► P Iran small industries	(B) Design pr	
(B)	0.5 year	- Data collecting	Sacandam	and industrial park		
		- Design required documents e.g., as-built sneets	stakeholders	organisation		(4) / \mathbf{P} Servant
		- Determining economic and social benefit			(C) Construction	phase X/
		- Clearing future challenges	Accredited	2) Province-represented	(C) Collisti detion	
(C)	1 year	- Providing materials and equipment	laboratory	manager	(5)	(B) End-user
	-	- Constructing building	. e .			<u></u>
		- Installing equipment		3)		//X
(D)	1 year	- Running the system	Researcher		(D) Temporary denv	ery phase
		- Operating for about one year Diagnostic and fiving the problems			6/ 9/	
		- Diagnosuc and fixing the problems	Producer (1	4) III (
(E)	25 years	- Monitoring the system		Consultant	(E) Operation t	
(1)	20 yours	- Maintenance the system			(E) Operation j	Shase
		- Purchasing chemicals or any other required	I Supplier	0		
		instruments	. e .			
		- Selling treated wastewater to end-users	- Unfluencer	5)		
No.		Role in the project	No	Role in	the project	
(1) (2)	Deciding about de	veloping and running the feasibility study	(9)	Buying the treated wastewater a	s new water resource	
(2) (3)	Determining and f	inancing the project	(10) Constructing the ATUS	and remove gaps and faults	
(3)	Cooperating in dat	a collection	(11)) Measuring the quality of wastew	vater as input of design phase	
(5)	Monitoring and re	porting about progress	(12)	R&D about new equipment	vater as input of design phase	
(6)	Feasibility study a	bout the project, Designing and providing as built sheets a	and documents (14) Selling produced equipment		
(7)	Paying the costs of	f operation	(15) Selling imported equipment		
(8)	Technical operation	n	(16) Encouraging all the stakeholders	s to continue and improve the process	
		Figure A1. Stak	eholders involve	d in Iran's industrial waste	water reuse projects	

Job position	Service time (Year)	Type of stakeholders	Numbers of responders
Politician:			•
- Staff of Vice-Presidency	15<	Secondary	1
Government:		-	
- Manager of Ministry of Industry	15<	Primary	1
- Manager of Iran Small Industries and Industrial Park Organization	15<	Primary	3
- Province-represented manager	5-10	Primary	12
- Supervisor of the industrial park	<5	Primary	6
Industry:		-	
- Board of trustee of industrial park	<5	Primary	8
- Servant	5-15<	Primary	4
Consultant:		-	
- Manager	15<	Primary	3
- Designer	5-10	Primary	9
Contractor:		-	
- Manager	15<	Primary	2
- Staff	<5	Primary	4
Laboratory:		-	
- Manager	5-10	Secondary	2
- Staff	<5	Secondary	4
Provider:			
- Suppliers	15<	Secondary	1
- Producer	15<	Secondary	1
Researcher:			
- University	15<	Secondary	3
- Institute	5-10	Secondary	2
End user:			
- Manager of industry	15<	Primary	8
Influencer:			
- Manager of non-governmental organization	15<	Secondary	2
- Religious leader	15<	Secondary	1
- Social influencer	<5	Secondary	1
		Total	78

		Table A2	2. Casual layered structure for case study	
Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Metaphor layer
gu	1. <u>Technical</u> problem: New	1.1. Government gives no credence to new	1.1.1. Routine works bring more efficiency and risks may cause	1.1.1.1. No systemic thinking
Planni	innovative technologies are not	ideas	total failure which ruin all the efforts	1.1.1.2. No long-term thinking
	accepted, and decision makers		1.1.2. Some senior managers are not trusted by top level	1.1.2.1. No meritocracy and
	rely on currently tested		managers	criticism flexibility
	technologies		1.1.3. A failure in initial steps ruins the whole project	1.1.3.1. No systemic thinking
				1.1.3.2. No long-term thinking
	2. Economic problem: There is	2.1 Government wants to operate the project	2.1.1. Some governmental managers introduce the project to	2.1.1.1. Quantity-oriented or
	no additional or extra financial	earlier, even if it runs with set of problems	improve their resume for political and official offers	individualism criteria
	budget for investment on such	2.2. Government neglects to long-time fully	2.2.1. The project inauguration is just for show to present the	2.2.1.1. Quantity-oriented or
	these projects	fund the projects	operation not to perform properly. Therefore, they prefer to	individualism criteria
			investment on operation of quick impact projects	
	3. <u>Social</u> problem: All	3.1. Government does not properly recognise	3.1.1. It is factory owners' duty to treat the wastewater.	3.1.1.1. Sense of being wiser
	stakeholders do not participate in	factory owners as stakeholders	Therefore, it is not necessary to justify the issue for them and	than others
	planning phase		government can always coerce them	
			3.1.2. Factory owners only concern about personal benefits.	3.1.2.1. Sense of being wiser
			Hence, they have no sufficient vision and understandings.	than others
			3.1.3. Factory owners do not have sufficient educational level.	3.1.3.1. Sense of being wiser
			As a result, their ideas are less worthy of notice	than others
ign	4. Social problem: Qualified		4.1.1. The least costly option is the best one	4.1.1.1. No long-term integrated
Desi	consultant is not selected, and			thinking

Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Metaphor layer
	another consultant cannot design	4.1. Government does not choose the high	4.1.2. Some employer's members show favouritism and bias	4.1.2.1. Adherence is considered
	properly.	qualified consultant because of economic		as an anti-value
		limitations		
		4.2. Consultant does not have sufficient	4.2.1. There is no up to dating in lack of serious rivals	4.2.1.1. Quantity-oriented or
		education to design properly and do not keep		individualism criteria
		their knowledge up to date.		
		4.3. Politician in charge of sanctions, which	4.3.1. Foreign governments and consultants are not trustable,	4.3.1.1. Insufficient trust
		cause inability to upgrade knowledge by	and they may want to follow their political goals	between stakeholders
		consultants.		
		4.4. Government pressures on consultants to	4.4.1. The project inauguration is just for show to present the	4.4.1.1. Quantity-oriented or
		limiting the time of collecting data. Which	operation not to perform properly, Therefore, government	individualism criteria
		effect on design quality.	prefers to invest on quick impact projects.	
		4.5. <u>Government</u> pressures on consultants to	4.5.1. Government thinks that only essential parameters (like	4.5.1.1. Sense of being wiser
		limiting the financial budget of collecting	BOD, COD, TSS and TDS) are enough and there is no need for	than others
		data.	thorough analysis.	
		4.6. Consultant is not informed of some useful	4.6.1. Foreign products are always better than native ones	4.6.1.1. Westernization
		domestic capacities.	je na se	
		4.7 Consultant does not use some beneficial	4.7.1 Foreign data is peripheral and not practical in the country	4711 Pan-Iranianism
		international data and experience		
		international data and experience.		

I hase Entany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Metaphor layer
	4.8. Consultant cannot use proper and state-	4.8.1. Foreign data is peripheral and not practical in the country	4.8.1.1. Pan-Iranianism
	of-the-art software and just provide typical		
	sheets which are not practical in every		
	projects.		
	4.9. Qualified consultant cannot present	4.9.1. Traditional marketing methods are profitable and there is	4.9.1.1. No systemic thinking
	itself properly. Therefore, it is not chosen.	no need to take new approaches	4.9.1.2. No long-term integrate
			thinking
5. <u>Social</u> problem: Fo	preign 5.1. Government does not trust to foreign	5.1.1. Native consultants are preferred to foreign ones due to	5.1.1.1. Pan-Iranianism
consultants are not recruite	d. consultants.	international relations' difficulties	Adherence is considered as
			anti-value
			5.1.1.2. Deeply gaps
6. <u>Technical</u> pro	blem: 6.1. Government does not request consultants	6.1.1. Some governmental staffs does not find its duty to	6.1.1.1. No systemic thinking
Knowledge are not docun	nented to give their complete documents.	providing documentation	6.1.1.2. No long-term integrate
properly for any further sha	ring.		thinking
		6.1.2. Some governmental staffs wants the details to be	6.1.2.1. Quantity-oriented
		classified because of being open threats one's position	individualism criteria
7. <u>Technical</u> problem: O	n-line 7.1. Government does not support such these	7.1.1. Laboratories are costive units	7.1.1.1. No long-term integrate
equipment are not installe	ed for costs.		thinking
providing up to dated de	sign's	7.1.2. The project must be unique and publishing data may blur	7.1.2.1. Quantity-oriented
		this goal	individualism criteria

Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Metaphor layer
		7.2. Industry does not give its experiences and	7.2.1. There is a fear to be falsely incriminated for leaked data	7.2.1.1.Adherence is considered
		data to the government or consultants.		as an anti-value
			7.2.2. Presenting data shows defects and is considered as a	7.2.2.1. Quantity-oriented or
			project failure	individualism criteria
			7.2.3. There is no need for proper documenting	7.2.3.1. Quantity-oriented or
				individualism criteria
		7.3. Industry fears that this data can used	7.3.1. The government is just looking for penalizing and getting	7.3.1.1. Insufficient trust
		against them by government.	extra money from people and also some governmental managers	between stakeholders
			just think about themselves in preference to provide services	
	8. <u>Social</u> problem: Recent	8.1. Consultant and Government do not	8.1.1. Studies conduct their experiments on a pilot scale not	8.1.1.1. Deeply gaps
	obtained Iranian studies are	accept academics. Therefore, they provide	industrial which provides useless data	
	ignored.	insufficient budget for studies.	8.1.2. Academics have no proper experiences and just follow	8.1.2.1. Deeply gaps
			different goals like publishing papers rather than meeting	
			industrial needs	
			8.1.3. There is no need to solve the problem of the industries,	8.1.3.1. Deeply gaps
			because they on which do not need to research, easily are solved.	
			Furthermore, government do not pay sufficient money for	
			proper research	
	9. Social problem: Accredited	9.1. Accredited laboratory has no proper	9.1.1. Laboratories do not trust (sometimes true and sometimes	9.1.1.1. Insufficient trust
	private laboratories are not hired	equipment to thoroughly analyse the	wrong) the government to continue its requests. Therefore, they	between stakeholders
		wastewater samples.	do not invest on equipping their laboratories	

Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Metaphor layer
	for determining the required			
	inputs.			
ion	10. <u>Technical</u> problem:	10.1. Government does not complain about	10.1.1. The project inauguration is just for show to present the	10.1.1.1. No systemic thinkin
struct	Contractors deliver the project	contractors' delays, because they fear, it may	operation not to perform properly	10.1.1.2. No long-te
Con	with huge delays	stop the project.		integrated thinking
			10.1.2. The project inauguration is just for show to present the	10.1.2.1. Quantity-oriented
			operation not to perform properly, Therefore, government prefer	individualism criteria
			to investment on quick impact projects	
		10.2. Contractor heavily looks for illegal	10.2.1. Government has strong financial resources. Therefore,	10.2.1.1. Adherence
		economic benefits.	they should be paid more money	considered as an anti-value
		10.3. Contractor has no adherence to design	10.3.1. Signing and entering into a contract, equals to	10.3.1.1. Adherence
		sheets.	monopolizing and owing it	considered as an anti-value
		10.4. Contractor claims are not considered.	10.4.1. The contractor is always Responsible and blamed	10.4.1.1. Sense of being wis
				than others
		10.5. Consultant is not properly supervised in	10.5.1. Sometimes, it is preferred to ignore the standing against	10.5.1.1. Adherence
		the case of contractors' unreasonable claims.	contractor in order to have individual benefits.	considered as an anti-value
	11. Social problem: Qualified	11.1. Government does not choose the high	11.1.1. The least costly option is the best one	11.1.1.1 No systemic thinking
	contractor is not selected, while	qualified contractors because of economic		11.1.1.2. No long-te
	others cannot construct properly.	limitations.		integrated thinking
			11.1.2. Some employer's members show favouritism and bias	11.1.2.1. Adherence
				considered as an anti-value

Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Metaphor layer
	11.2. Native <u>contractor</u> does not have	11.2.1. There is not up to dating in lack of serious rivals	11.2.1.1. Adherence
	sufficient education to construct properly and		considered as an anti-value
	do not keep their knowledge up to date.		
	11.3. Politician in charge of sanctions, which	11.3.1. Foreign governments and contractors are not trustable,	11.3.1.1. Insufficient trus
	cause inability to upgrade knowledge by	and they may want to follow their political goals	between stakeholders
	contractor.		
	11.4. Contractor does not use some beneficial	11.4.1. Foreign data is peripheral and not practical in the country	11.4.1.1. Pan-Iranianism
	international data and experience.		
	11.5. Some qualified <u>Contractors</u> cannot	11.5.1. Traditional marketing methods are profitable and there	11.5.1.1. Having no long-terr
	present themselves properly. Therefore, they	is no need to take new approaches	and systemic thinking
	do not choose the highest qualified contractor.		
	11.6. Government does not recruit foreign	11.6.1. Native contractors are preferred to foreign ones	11.6.1.1. Pan-Iranianism
	contractors.		11612 Adherence
			considered as an anti value
		11.60 History forming computants is not reasonable due to	11.6.2.1. Deeply some
		11.0.2. Hinning tolergin consultants is not reasonable due to	11.0.2.1. Deepiy gaps
12. <u>Economic</u> problem: Foreign	12.1. <u>Supplier</u> raises prices, resulting in	12.1.1. Suppliers are exclusive importers and can set rules	12.1.1.1. Adherence
component and equipment are	budget deficit.		considered as an anti-value
expensive and sometimes are	12.2. <u>Supplier</u> imports fake equipment.	12.2.1. Suppliers are exclusive importers and can set rules	12.2.1.1. Adherence i
unqualified.			considered as an anti-value
	Litany layer 12. Economic problem: Foreign component and equipment are expensive and sometimes are unqualified.	Litany layer Systematic layer 11.2. Native contractor does not have sufficient education to construct properly and do not keep their knowledge up to date. 11.3. Politician in charge of sanctions, which cause inability to upgrade knowledge by contractor. 11.4. Contractor does not use some beneficial international data and experience. 11.5. Some qualified Contractors cannot present themselves properly. Therefore, they do not choose the highest qualified contractor. 11.6. Government does not recruit foreign contractors. 11.6. Government does not recruit foreign contractors. 12. Economic problem: Foreign 12.1. Supplier raises prices, resulting in component and equipment are budget deficit. expensive and sometimes are 12.2. Supplier imports fake equipment.	Litany layer Systematic layer World view layer 11.2. Native contractor 11.2.1. There is not up to dating in lack of serious rivals sufficient do not keep their knowledge up to date. 11.3.1. Foreign governments and contractors are not trustable, cause inability to upgrade knowledge by and they may want to follow their political goals contractor. 11.4. Contractor does not use some beneficial 11.4.1. Foreign data is peripheral and not practical in the country international data and experience. 11.5.1. Some qualified Contractors 11.5.1. Traditional marketing methods are profitable and there present themselves properly. Therefore, they is no need to take new approaches on ot choose the highest qualified contractor. 11.6. Government does not recruit foreign 11.6.1. Native contractors are preferred to foreign ones contractors. 11.6.2. Hiring foreign consultants is not reasonable due to international relations' difficulties 12.1. Supplier raises prices, resulting in 2.1.1. Suppliers are exclusive importers and can set rules component and equipment are budget deficit. unqualified. 12.2.1. Suppliers are exclusive importers and can set rules

Phase	e Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Me	etaphor layer	
. <u> </u>	13. Technical problem: Foreign	13.1. Politician in charge of sanctions, which	13.1.1. Foreign companies are not trustable, and they may want	13.1.1.1.	Insufficient	trust
	component and equipment	cause government inability in proper financial	to follow their political goals.	between sta	akeholders	
	cannot be provided.	relationship by other foreign companies.				
	14. Technical problem: Some	14.1. producer does not product high quality	14.1.1. Native producers do not trust (sometimes true and	14.1.1.1.	Insufficient	trust
	domestic products have poor	products.	sometimes wrong) the government to continue its requests.	between sta	akeholders	
	quality.		Therefore, they do not invest on such these required			
			instruments.			
gui	15. <u>Technical</u> problem:	15.1. Although, Government act like field	15.1.1. Giving no credence to governmental supervision	15.1.1.1.	No lor	ng-term
eliver	Monitoring is not proper.	engineer, they have to pay attention to all		integrated	thinking	
rary u		other problems of industrial parks. Therefore,				
empo		there is no time for thorough supervision				
1		(Responsible stakeholder: Government)				
	16. <u>Technical</u> problem: Main	6.1. Contractor does not care about	16.1.1. Economic benefits are just considered	16.1.1.1.	Adherence	e is
	faults are not recognized.	maintenance because they are staff of		considered	as an anti-val	ue
		contractors which just wants to deliver the				
		project as soon as possible.				
		16.2. <u>Government</u> takes 10% of contractor's	16.2.1. Government does not want to pay the last part of	16.21.1.	Insufficient	trust
		contract and release it many times far away	financial budget and consequently hiring suitable operator is	between sta	akeholders	
		finishing contract. Therefore, contractor does	just a costive activity because the government has a history of			
		not rely on that and so that does not hire	these type of activities and also some governmental managers			
		accredited operator.	just think about themselves in preference to provide services			

Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	M	etaphor la	iyer
	17. <u>Social</u> problem: Proper	17.1. Government and also industry take no	17.1.1. Government just have duty about providing money and	17.1.1.1.	No	long-term
	operating is not taught to future	responsibility for training operators.	supervising for constructing the project and operating is	integrated	thinking	
	permanent operators.		responsible of the trustee board of industries			
			17.1.2. Industries do not know about details of the project and	17.1.2.1.	No	long-term
			have been forced for delivering the project	integrated	thinking	
3	18. <u>Economic</u> problem:	18.1. Government provides 50% of the	18.1.1. The private sectors know they will not be questioned and	18.1.1.1.	Adher	ence is
	Payments of the loans are not	operational costs as a 5-year loan. Only 5% of	arraigned because of other laws (like manufacturer protection	considered	l as an anti	-value
)	returned in this phase.	these loans, however, are paid back in practice	act) which they can use them against the government			
		by boards of trustees. While the government	18.1.2. Some top-level managers do not care for these problems	18.1.2.1.	No	long-term
		is not allowed to reprimand and punish them	and have no critical vision about them	integrated	thinking	
		for not returning governmental aids.	18.1.3. Private sectors believe that water is a free natural	18.1.3.1.	Quantity-0	oriented or
			resource and providing it is the government's duty	individuali	sm criteria	1
				18.1.3.2.	Adher	ence is
				considered	l as an anti	-value
			18.1.4. Private sectors believe that the government is just	18.1.4.1.	Insuffic	ient trust
			looking for getting revenue because it has a history of getting	between st	akeholder	S
			financial amount but giving no services in return and also some			
			governmental managers just think about themselves in			
			preference to provide services			
				18151 N	Jo systemi	c thinking
	-			10.1.0.1.1	to system	e tilling

hase Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Met	taphor layer
		18.1.5. Private sectors believe that it is an opportunity to express	18.1.5.2.	No long-term
		their dissidence with government's other policies	integrated th	ninking
		18.1.6. Private sectors estimate all events by direct cost methods	18.1.6.1.	No long-term
		because these projects only have costive consequences	integrated th	hinking
19. <u>Social</u> problem: Treated	1 19.1. Industry abuses the treated wastewater	19.1.1. The obtained effluent is a private ownership not public	19.1.1.1.	Adherence is
wastewater is not used for	r for their personal factories and there is no		considered a	as an anti-value
primary purpose.	supervision on this issue.			
20. Technical problem: Treated	1 20.1.Industry does not fund to maintenance	20.1.1. Private sectors believe that water is free as a natural	20.1.1.1.	Adherence is
wastewater has no proper	r budgets.	resource and providing it, is the duty of the government	considered a	as an anti-value
quantity.		20.1.2. These projects are luxury and not really necessary	20.1.2.1.	No long-tern
			integrated th	hinking
	20.2.Industry does not repair and	20.2.1. Only in times of disrepair, it is necessary to take action	20.2.1.1.	No long-tern
	maintenance schedule.	for repairing	integrated th	hinking
		20.2.2. No one can prove that operators neglect their jobs' duties	20.2.2.1.	No long-tern
			integrated tl	hinking
21. Technical problem: Treated	1 21.1. Industry do not inject required	21.1.1. Injecting chemicals is peripheral	21.1.1.1.	Adherence i
wastewater has no proper quality	. chemicals.		considered ;	as an anti-value
		21.1.2. No one can prove that operators neglect their jobs' duties	21.1.2.1.	Adherence i
			considered	as an anti-value
			considered (

Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	Μ	etaphor la	nyer
		21.2. Government does not install online	21.2.1. Giving no credence to supervision	21.2.1.1.	No	long-term
		control in input quality, which results low		integrated	thinking	
		quality influent entering into the system and				
		reduce the performance.				
		21.3. Industry does not analyse the output	21.3.1. Only in times of disrepair, it is necessary to take action	21.3.1.1.	No	long-term
		effluent's quality.	for repairing	integrated	thinking	
			21.3.2. No one can prove that operators neglect their jobs' duties	21.3.1.1.	Adher	ence is
				considered	l as an anti	i-value
		21.4. Politician in charge of sanctions, which	21.4.1. Foreign companies do not sell their products and some	21.4.1.1.	Insuffic	ient trus
		cause after-sale service is not implemented in	of them may want to follow their political goals.	between st	takeholder	s
		Iran.				
	22. <u>Social</u> problem: Operators are	22.1. Industry does not fund the costs.	22.1.1. Training is a costive action	22.1.1.1.	No	long-term
	not trained properly.			integrated thinking		
		22.2. <u>Industry</u> education is irrelevant.	22.2.1. Operating does not require proficiency	22.2.1.1.	Adher	ence is
				considered	l as an anti	i-value
		22.3. Industry is not interested to receive	22.3.1. Experience is prior to education	22.3.1.1.	Sense of 1	being wise
		training.		than other	S	
	23. Social problem: Major faults	23.1. <u>Industry</u> does not report the problems to	23.1.1. Operators fear from dismissal and deposition	23.1.1.1.	Adher	ence is
	are not reported to governmental	the government.		considered	l as an anti	i-value
	supervisors.					

Phase	Litany layer	Systematic layer	World view layer	M	etaphor layer	
	24. Social problem: End users do	24.1. Industry does not trust effluent's quality	24.1.1. The whole system is not trustable, and all stakeholders	24.1.1.1.	Insufficient	trust
	not buy the treated wastewater as	because it does not trust to government.	just think about their goals	between st	akeholders	
	a renewable water resource.		24.1.2. Some private sectors believe that it is an opportunity to	24.1.2.1. N	No systemic thin	nking
			express their dissidence with the boards of trustees' other			
			policies			
		24.2. Influencer does not trust effluent's	24.2.1. The whole system is not trustable, and all stakeholders	24.2.1.1.	Insufficient	trust
		quality due to insufficient trust to	just think about their goals	between st	takeholders	
		government.				
		24.3. Influencer does not accept the results	24.3.1. New things must be approved by traditional thinking	24.3.1.1.	Sense of being	wiser
		due to lack of knowledge.		than others	S	

1 Part B. Detailed results

Table B1. Categories of mentioned perception problems based on the core phases of the case study's project

Core phases	Frequency of responders' general perceptions	Share (%)
Planning	6	7.7
Design	35	44.9
Construction	3	3.8
Temp. delivery	15	19.2
Operation	19	24.4
Total	78	100



Figure B1. Correlation between identified visible problems, responsible stakeholders, and beliefs through the core phases of ATU projects.